

28 November 1951

POINTS for ADPC

REBUTTAL of CHIEF, JSPD, PAPER
CIA/OPC STRATEGIC PLAN

1. NSC 10/5 furnished guidance to PSB for determining scope, pace, and allocation of priorities, and provides for an "intensification of covert operations designed in general order of emphasis to":

- a. place maximum strength ~~in~~ the Soviet structure of power;
- b. strengthen orientation toward the U.S. of the Free World;
- c. develop underground resistance consistent with a, above, and ensure availability of those forces in event of war.

2. From the above it is derived that it is PSB's ultimate responsibility to decide relative amounts of CIA/OPC effort to be applied to:

- a. current operations in cold war period;
- b. making preparations for support of Military Forces in event of general war.

3. The CIA/OPC Strategic ~~Plan~~ Plan was drafted prior to the establishment of the PSB; hence guidance was not forthcoming. It was necessary for OPC to suggest relative priorities which could serve as bases for discussion.

4. The task of making preparations for general war, which was assigned a priority rating of 30 per cent, applies only to those preparations which are exclusively for wartime application.

5. The total covert resources which will be available for support of Military Forces in wartime will be much larger than indicated by the 30 per cent effort, since virtually all assets developed in connection with cold war will be available and transferrable to wartime use.

6. Supporting the foregoing and presenting a more realistic picture, observe the following with respect to percentage projection of funds estimated for the FY1953 budget:

- a. For purely cold war purposes 38.5%
- b. For ^{and hot} cold war, ^{the bulk of "cold"} rapidly convertible to "hot" 46%
- c. For hot war purposes only. 15.5%